

BILDUNG: THE SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL TRADITION

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In England and France as well as in Germany during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, the leading secondary schools and universities prepared their graduates almost exclusively for the liberal professions, the higher civil service, the church, and secondary and university teaching.¹ There was virtually no direct relationship between advanced education and the early industrial economy, and the social distribution of educational advantages was by no means congruent with the distribution of wealth and economic power. Two more or less distinct middle-class hierarchies rose above the broad base of a peasant and artisanal society: the economy-oriented hierarchy of early industrial capitalism, and an education-oriented hierarchy that encompassed the civil service and was closely linked to the state, especially in France and Germany. The rank order of education competed not only with the surviving hierarchy of aristocratic birth, but also with the emerging commercial and industrial hierarchy.

In fact, the status conventions and life styles transmitted by the leading educational institutions in England and France were quasi-aristocratic. The ideals of the educated gentleman and of the *honnête homme* were compromises, in an almost Freudian sense, between an inherited gentry and clerical culture on the one hand, and middle-class notions of advancement through learning on the other. In economically backward Prussia, the highly educated conceived of themselves as an intellectual and cultural elite, as distinct both from the burgher world from which they came and from the old aristocracy of birth. More generally, the outlook of the European educated classes was shaped more by ideals of education, of rational autonomy, and of state and professional service, than by the entrepreneurial and market orientations usually associated with the rising industrial 'bourgeoisie'.

We are too much accustomed to assume that nineteenth-century middle-class ideologies *had* to take the form they actually took *only* among certain sectors of the entrepreneurial middle class in early nineteenth-century England. We think of economic individualism and utilitarianism, of the individual conceived as a rational economic and political agent, and of the market, or the political process, as an arena in which conflicting individual choices are balanced and aggregated into collective trends or policies. If we are historians of Germany, this kind of assumption, whether conscious or not, is likely to leave us forever wondering why German middle-class thinkers did not in fact think as our English norm demands.

My own view is that the ideology of *Bildung* was for the German educated middle class of the nineteenth century what the ideology of economic

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individualism was to the English entrepreneurial middle class of the early nineteenth century. It was the dominant form of middle-class ideology, though not the only form. As such, it requires separate attention in its own right, particularly since it proved paradigmatic for aspects of middle-class thought in nineteenth-century England and France, just as the English entrepreneurial ideology proved paradigmatic for aspects of middle-class thought in France and Germany. Like most historians, moreover, I believe that ideologies present among broad groups have social and historical as well as purely intellectual causes. I therefore take it to be an important historical task to link the German ideology of *Bildung* to certain peculiarities of German historical development, just as the English ideology of economic individualism is usually linked to certain peculiarities of English historical development.

What I take to be peculiarities of the German pattern should *not* be assigned a special status; nineteenth-century German history was no more nor less 'unique' than nineteenth-century French or English history. But of course there were differences between national paths that continue to be of interest for comparative and causal forms of historical analysis. Thus economic historians have come to distinguish a universal history of capitalist *industrialisation* from distinctive national patterns of development that were partly shaped by the timing of each nation's entry into the broader dynamic of accumulation and technological innovation. But much the same can be said for what I am disposed to call *educationalisation*, a cross-national process that has had profound and partly comparable impacts on all the major West European societies during the nineteenth century and since, and that was first launched in the German states during the decades around 1800.

Indeed, the most important point to be made about the history of secondary and higher education in modern Germany is simply that key processes in it took place relatively early, both in comparison with similar processes in other countries, and in relation to the German schedule of economic development. Well before the rapid industrialisation of Germany after 1870, a kind of educational revolution occurred in the German universities of the early nineteenth century that anticipated subsequent developments elsewhere. The German 'philosophical' faculties broke through the institutional framework initially defined by the task of training and certifying secondary teachers, and the modern research university was born.² The phenomenon had something in common with the proverbial 'takeoff' into sustained economic growth. Once under way, it proved both cumulative and paradigmatic, and inquiries into its origins tend to focus on preconditions that were jointly but not separately sufficient to give rise to it. Among these preconditions, one has to count the survival and subsequent revitalisation of the German territorial universities during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which were due in large measure to the intervention of princely governments.³ The confessional history of the German territories, the presence of an educated Protestant pastorate and of influential theological faculties at the German universities, along with the efforts of the German states to control the clerical professions, all these mattered as well.

But the most important precondition of the German educational revolution was almost certainly the early emergence, in Prussia and in other German states, of professional bureaucracies recruited largely if not wholly on the basis of

educational qualifications. This form of bureaucratic modernisation gave great prominence to advanced education as a basis for middle-class aspirations in Germany, particularly since entrepreneurial capitalism long remained poorly developed as an alternate field of opportunity.

Thus during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a social group emerged in Germany that had no full counterpart in France or in England. This was the *Bildungsbürgertum*, the educated middle class. The group is probably best defined as encompassing all secondary school graduates, holders of the *Abitur* certificate, which became the sole prerequisite for university study. Among the members of the *Bildungsbürgertum*, some were university educated members of the high civil service and of the liberal professions, who usually enjoyed fairly comfortable incomes as well. Yet, unlike the French *bourgeoisie* of the same period, the *Bildungsbürgertum* as a whole was characterised less by wealth and political power than by a measure of advanced education that sometimes in fact stopped short of secondary graduation. Particularly in the intermediate ranks of the civil service, in the Protestant pastorate, and in the teaching professions themselves, prospective entrants into the *Bildungsbürgertum* found a channel of social ascent and a source of self-esteem in which education was the primary measure of social and personal worth.

In this context, the absence of competing sources of self-definition helped to shape an ethos that became characteristic of the *Bildungsbürgertum* as a whole. A modern concept of vocation (*Beruf*) evolved from earlier, largely religious conceptions,⁴ and the ideal of *Bildung* emerged as the most viable universalist alternative to the ascribed status of noble birth. In sum, the German *Bildungsbürgertum* arose as a modern 'merit' elite, an *intellectual* aristocracy as distinct from a hereditary one. But of course it also gradually separated itself from the artisanal world in which it originated, while the concept of *Bildung* came to echo some of the aristocratic qualities it was meant to replace.

I have elsewhere characterised the German *Bildungsbürgertum* of the nineteenth century as a 'mandarin' elite, and my purpose was not simply to introduce a dismissive slogan.⁵ I was thinking primarily of Max Weber's characterisation of the Chinese literati. I intended mainly to name a form of middle-class ideology, namely that of *Bildung*. Moreover, I continue to be particularly interested in the German university professors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whom I called 'mandarin intellectuals'. The prominent place of the university professors in nineteenth-century German society still seems to me more than an accident. Their role, their sense of self, and their conception of learning, I would continue to argue, were deeply affected by a primary identification with *Bildung*.

After all, they stood at the apex of the crucial hierarchy of education in nineteenth-century Germany. Almost by definition, they were the foremost representatives of the *Bildungsbürgertum*, or of what were called the 'academic' professions. They understandably claimed the right to speak for the educated classes as a whole, and thus in effect to articulate the cultural aspirations of the nation. At the same time, they largely defined and filled the role of the intellectual in modern Germany.⁶ Leisured amateurs and writers working directly for the literary market have contributed in important ways to modern Germany intellectual and cultural life; but they were clearly less numerous and probably

less influential there, collectively, than they were in France and England, at least until the end of the nineteenth century. It therefore continues to seem to me possible and causally important to understand certain common assumptions of German university scholars as outgrowths of a 'mandarin' ideology of *Bildung*.

I am best acquainted with the way in which the concept of *Bildung* was actually used by German university professors in the humanities and social sciences between about 1890 and 1930. Thus the following definition is taken from a standard encyclopedia of the Weimar period.

The fundamental concept of pedagogy since Pestalozzi, *Bildung* means forming the soul by means of the cultural environment. *Bildung* requires: (a) an individuality which, as the unique starting point, is to be developed into a formed or value-saturated personality; (b) a certain universality, meaning richness of mind and person, which is attained through the understanding and experiencing (*Verstehen und Erleben*) of the objective cultural values; (c) totality, meaning inner unity and firmness of character.⁷

Certain features of the concept are more fully articulated in a 1911 essay by the sociologist and philosopher Georg Simmel, from which the following passage is taken.

Every kind of learning, virtuosity, refinement in a man cannot cause us to attribute true cultivation to him if these things function . . . only as superadditions that come to his personality from a normative realm external to it and ultimately remain external to it. In such a case, a man may have cultivated attributes, but he is not cultivated; cultivation comes about only if the contents absorbed out of the suprapersonal realm (of objectified cultural values) seem, as through a secret harmony, to unfold only that in the soul which exists within it as its own instinctual tendency and as the inner prefiguration of its subjective perfection.⁸

Both passages describe the process of *Bildung* as a relationship between a learner and a set of texts. The texts are objectively given; they make up a 'suprapersonal' realm of 'objective cultural values'. The learner 'absorbs' the 'contents' of the suprapersonal realm to become a 'value-saturated' personality. Obviously, his 'understanding' or 'experiencing' is more than analytical or intellectual; for his whole being is affected. *Bildung* transforms a unique 'individuality' into a unified 'totality'. Particularly Simmel insists upon the 'secret harmony' with which the cultural contents 'unfold' only what already 'exists' within the soul. He writes that this harmony *seems* to obtain between the end state of 'subjective perfection' and its anterior 'prefiguration'. The cultivated individual is at once a unified totality and in harmony with his prior 'instinctual tendency'. The teleological image of personal development as an 'unfolding' implies a narrative of the movement toward perfection that becomes fully coherent only when perfection has been reached, and when the soul's preexistent tendency can indeed be identified as a 'prefiguration'.

The relationship between the reader and the text is an interpretive or 'hermeneutic' one. In one of its variants, it can be conceived as a dialectical interaction, in that the reader must actively posit *possible* interpretations, which the text then 'shows' to be more or less effective in clarifying or integrating what

at first appeared obscure or incoherent. The more one stresses this active role of the reader in a dialectic of 'understanding', the less mystery there is in the 'secret harmony' between the soul's 'instinctual tendency' and what it assimilates on the way to perfection. Yet particularly the encyclopedia definition strongly suggests a more passive account of the interpretive relationship as a repeated 'experiencing' or *Erleben*. Here the reader empathetically identifies with the author and reproduces or 'relives' the inner states that gave rise to the text. Because he identifies in this way, he can be 'saturated' with the values embodied in what he reads. As Max Weber pointed out in a related context, the canonical sources of the tradition have charismatic or magical qualities that enrich and elevate those who 'make them their own'.⁹

If most German academics were more or less consciously committed to the concept of *Bildung* from the late eighteenth century on, then much is explained that would otherwise remain merely given. Thus the German research university of the nineteenth century drew some of its vitality from the neohumanist enthusiasm of the eighteenth century, which also inspired a new vision of education. The birth of the research seminar and the subsequent expansion of the 'philosophical' faculties were linked to the emergence of the philological and interpretive disciplines, which initially shaped the dominant paradigms of exact scholarship or *Wissenschaft*. In nineteenth-century German historiography, what may be called the *principle of empathy* demanded that historical epochs be understood 'in their own terms', or that the past-minded historian 'put himself in the place of' the historical agents he seeks to comprehend. In philosophy, the post-Kantian Idealists were dedicated to the image of *Geist* or mind unfolding and comprehending itself in its creations. The word *Geisteswissenschaft* did not come into common use until the later nineteenth century, but the interpretive and philosophical tradition that really defined it was of course much older.¹⁰

Along with the principle of empathy and the hermeneutic tradition more generally, the two cited passages imply what may be called the *principle of individuality*. For *Bildung* is the self-development of a unique 'individuality', the 'unfolding' from within of a distinctive potentiality. Nothing 'comes' to the learner from 'outside'; his perfection is the actualisation of a pre-existent 'tendency'. Obviously, this conception of education differs radically, not only from any 'socialisation' of the learner by an external agent, but also from any mere 'superaddition' of information or of analytical skills. The cultivated individual, too, is a unique and unified 'totality'. Almost literally incomparable, he cannot be defined merely by being located on a single, universally applicable scale of rationality. The fullness or wholeness of his personality transcends any 'abstract' or 'reductive' characterisation that would make him a predictable agent in the manner of the utilitarian rationalist or of 'economic man'.

To be committed to this concept of individuality, whether in full consciousness or not, is to be guided toward certain analogous schemes of thought about change, about the relationship of the particular to the general, and of the individual to the group. Thus change is likely to appear the development of a unique whole 'from within', the teleological unfolding of a potentiality (or 'tendency'), or the actualisation of a preexistent essence, not a 'mechanical' rearrangement of identical constituent units. On the analogy of a symphony, a grouping is likely to be conceived as a patterned whole, a configuration of unique

elements in particular relationships to each other, a higher unity-in-diversity, with a 'total' quality of its own, rather than a sum of similar parts.¹¹ Something like this *symphonic analogy* came into play, for example, when German academics of the decades after 1890 addressed the crucial relationship between the cultivated individual and his national culture. Merely aggregative views of that relationship could not seem adequate, especially since the creative genius was seen as a unique embodiment rather than an average representative of his culture.

In social studies, the principle of empathy and the symphonic analogy favored an emphasis upon the interpretable individual, upon networks of interpersonal relationships, and upon unique 'wholes', rather than upon abstract sums of rational agents. In the German historical tradition, national states and epochs as well as persons could be conceived as unique individualities, rather than as products of timeless laws. This view was codified in the philosopher Wilhelm Windelband's 1894 distinction between 'nomothetic' and 'ideographic' disciplines.¹²

In a 1923 essay, the historian Ernst Troeltsch identified the 'concept of individuality' as the heart of the German Romantic critique of 'the whole mathematical-mechanistic West European scientific spirit'.

(An individuality is) a particular concretion of the divine spirit in unique persons and in suprapersonal communal organizations. The basic constituents of reality are not similar material and social atoms and universal laws . . . but differing unique personalities and individualizing formative forces . . . The state and society are not created from the individual by way of contract and utilitarian rationality, but from the suprapersonal spiritual forces which emanate from the most important and creative individuals, the spirit of the people or the religious idea . . . (Similarly, humanity is) not the ultimate notion of fundamentally equal human beings in a rationally organized total humanity, but the fullness of contending national spirits . . . All (cultures) together in mutual complementation represent the totality of life.¹³

The passage makes quite clear how the idea of individuality was connected with distinctive schemes of change and of groupings. Like Simmel and others, Troeltsch meant to confront the uniform calculating agent of the French Enlightenment, or of the English utilitarians and classical economists, with a less 'atomistic', fuller and more qualitative model of the individual, and thus also to justify a form of *cultural* individualism that could be reconciled with the individual's obligation to his community. At the same time, he hoped to recommend a German view of the relationships among nations that seemed more supportive of cultural diversity than 'Western' conceptions of democratic internationalism. That was the point of his emphasis upon 'the fullness of contending national spirits'. *Bildung* implied diversity and symphonic fullness.

The idea of self-cultivation profoundly affected the German concept of *Wissenschaft*, which broadly encompassed all systematic disciplines, including the interpretive ones, of course. There was a common belief that productive involvement in research usually would, and certainly should, have the effect of *Bildung*. The original scholar was meant to emerge from his activity enriched in mind *and person*. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this

expectation was also expressed in the recurring proposition that *Wissenschaft* should engender *Weltanschauung*, a comprehensive and partly evaluative orientation toward the world.¹⁴ The pursuit of truth was to lead to something like integral insight and moral certainty, or *personal* knowledge, or wisdom. Construed as a utopian hope, this expectation is unproblematic and humanly understandable. As an immediate and conscious aim, or as a standard for distinguishing adequate from inadequate *Wissenschaft*, however, such a visionary aspiration can be problematic indeed.

Similarly strenuous was a traditional insulation of *Wissenschaft* from practical concerns. Although mathematics had a place in classical secondary education in Germany as elsewhere, hermeneutic studies clearly ranked as the primary source of *Bildung*. To the extent that *Wissenschaft* was linked to the objective of *Bildung*, therefore, practical and experimental knowledge was at least *theoretically* undervalued, and rather difficult to conceptualise. Laboratory science depends upon controlled intervention in an environment. Yet German treatises on *Bildung* and *Wissenschaft* between 1890 and 1930 rarely included positive references to practical activity. On the contrary, they usually inveighed against instrumental or 'utilitarian' conceptions of knowledge, and they tended almost automatically to identify 'pure' *Wissenschaft* as impractical.¹⁵ It was as if a symbolic hierarchy extended downward from abstract theory to experimental or causal analysis, and finally to merely 'technical' or 'applied' studies.

I shall say little here about the origins of *Bildung* as a concept, and I recognise that my approach may appear somewhat anachronistic. Much fruitful research has been done in recent years on the emergence of *Bildung* as a newly influential concept by around 1790.¹⁶ I am not expert enough to form an independent opinion on these matters. Nevertheless, I remain convinced that beliefs and practices in education decisively affected the wider German Romantic and Idealist tradition that took shape during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As I have tried to show, though for a later time, *the concept of Bildung engendered cognitive dispositions that played a structuring role far beyond the formative field of discourse on education itself.*

The main historical point I do want to make is that there was a dramatic change in the meaning of *Bildung* sometime between 1800 and 1900, a change that is best described as a shift from a forward-looking or 'utopian' emphasis to a defensive or 'ideological' one. Other forms of middle-class ideology underwent a similar transformation. Around 1800, the idea of self-enhancement through *Bildung* was, among other things, a socially progressive and universalist challenge to permanent social distinctions based on birth. Advanced education was not in fact available to everyone, but it seemed universally accessible *in principle*. The emerging educated middle class could in good conscience regard itself as an 'open' or 'merit' elite, a new aristocracy of intelligence and personal worth. To speak for education was in some sense to speak for all men against unjust and humanly irrelevant social barriers. By around 1900 or 1920, in sharp contrast, advanced education itself had taken on the character of a distinguishing social privilege. With the full institutionalisation of secondary and higher education and of the credentials system, educational qualifications had become routinised sources of social status. An established educated upper middle class now sought to check the influx of new social groups into the universities, and thus

to reduce competition for places in the 'academic' professions.

As the concept of *Bildung* took on a socially confirmative character during the course of the nineteenth century, some of its other implications changed as well. Thus there was an unmistakable shift in the relationship of the mandarin intellectuals to the state. In some of Humboldt's early writings, he had insisted that human improvement can come only from the development of free individualities in interaction with each other. This was the *cultural* individualism that so impressed John Stuart Mill. Even in Humboldt's projects for the reorganisation of Prussian higher education in 1809–1810, he saw the state as providing no more than a material environment for the autonomous life of *Wissenschaft*. Nevertheless, the institutional arrangements he actually made or conceded in fact gave considerable scope to state intervention in university affairs. More importantly, to some of his contemporaries, and to many German university professors of later eras, this did not seem troublesome; or it seemed less and less troublesome. For they tended to regard the existing state as an adequate embodiment of the 'cultural state' (*Kulturstaat*), the disinterested supporter and earthly representative of their national culture. Especially as they began to see themselves as a threatened minority, German academics moved toward an ever firmer commitment to the bureaucratic monarchy, which sustained their institutions, protected their social position, and accepted their claim to speak for their nation as a whole.¹⁷

Bildung around 1800, moreover, had been invested with a collective and even transcendent significance that was gradually dissipated in the century that followed. The early German neohumanists had seriously looked to antiquity for universally and eternally valid cultural norms. The Protestant antecedents of German Idealism, too, had conferred an almost religious meaning upon the pursuit of *Bildung*. Though that meaning was affected by the individualist element in Protestantism, it still linked *Bildung* to a universal vision of human salvation. In the metaphysical language of German Idealism, the self-realization of mind was the transcendent aim of human existence. As that spiritual connotation gradually faded, however, it became ever more damaging that neither Humboldt nor the great Idealists had taken a clear and consistent position on the *material* and *social* preconditions of individual *Bildung*, or on its this-worldly consequences for *all* members of a human community. Left in a kind of spiritual and social vacuum, the cultivation of the isolated self ultimately became a truly gratuitous and strictly private enterprise, a higher form of selfishness.¹⁸

Thus the social meaning of *Bildung* certainly changed during the course of the 19th century. Yet the forms of thought associated with the paradigm of *Bildung* continued to shape the *Geisteswissenschaften* in general and the German historical tradition in particular. During a period of social and cultural crisis that extended from the closing decades of the 19th century to the 1920s, the methodological preferences that characterise the German historical and interpretive disciplines became more explicit than they had ever been. The work of Wilhelm Dilthey and Heinrich Rickert, of Georg Simmel and Max Weber, of Ernst Troeltsch and Friedrich Meinecke articulated and codified much that had previously been implicit in German scholarly practice. But the methodological

principles that were developed in this way are most easily understood as further elaborations upon the concept of *Bildung*.

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NOTES

1. For what follows, see Fritz K. Ringer, *Education and Society in Modern Europe* (Bloomington and London: University of Indiana Press, 1979), esp. the Introduction; Detlef K. Müller, Fritz Ringer and Brian Simon, eds, *The Rise of the Modern Educational System; Structural Change and Social Reproduction 1870–1920* (Cambridge University Press, 1987), esp. the Introduction (Ringer), and Chapters 1 (Müller), 2 (Ringer) and 3 (Simon).
2. R. Steven Turner, 'The Growth of Professional Research in Prussia, 1818–1848: Causes and Context', *Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences* (1971), pp. 137–182; R. Steven Turner, 'University Reformers and Professional Scholarship in Germany, 1760–1806', in Lawrence Stone, ed., *The University in Society: Studies in the History of Higher Education* (Princeton University Press, 1974), Vol. II, pp. 495–531.
3. Charles E. McClelland, *State, Society and University in Germany 1700–1914* (Cambridge University Press, 1980), esp. on Göttingen.
4. See Anthony J. LaVopa, *Grace, Talent and Merit: Poor Students, Clerical Careers and Professional Ideology in 18th-Century Germany* (Cambridge University Press, 1988).
5. Fritz K. Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), translated as *Die Gelehrten: Der Niedergang der deutschen Mandarine 1890–1933* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1983). See also Fritz Ringer, 'Differences and Cross-National Similarities among Mandarins', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XX (1986), pp. 145–164.
6. A key work on this whole subject is still Theodor Geiger, *Aufgaben und Stellung der Intelligenz in der Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart, 1949).
7. From *Der grosse Brockhaus*, 15th ed. (1928–35), as cited in Ringer, *Decline of the German Mandarins*, p. 86.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 90–99, 102–103.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 99–102, 108, 117–118.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 324–325.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 100–101 and pp. 160, 185–187, 195–196 for the context that follows. Steven Lukes also draws on Troeltsch, as well as on Simmel, in a clear, comparative account of the German concept of individuality; see Steven Lukes, *Individualism: Key Concepts in the Social Sciences* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), esp. pp. 17–32.
14. Ringer, *Decline of the German Mandarins*, pp. 103–107.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 109–113.
16. See especially Rudolf Vierhaus, 'Bildung', in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhard Kosellek, eds, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, Vol. I (Stuttgart: Klett, 1972), pp. 508–551.
17. Humboldt's sense of '*reine Wissenschaft*' was probably less formal than some of his

later German interpreters have suggested; he thought the universities and research should not aim at usefulness, but might then prove practically beneficial in fact. See Wilhelm von Humboldt, 'Über die innere und äussere Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin', in *Die Idee der deutschen Universität: Die fünf Grundschriften* (Darmstadt: Hermann Gentner, 1956), pp. 377–386; David Sorkin, 'Wilhelm von Humboldt: The Theory and Practice of Self-Formation (*Bildung*), 1791–1810,' *Journal of the History of Ideas* (1983), pp. 55–73; Ringer, *Decline of the German Mandarins*, pp. 23–25, 110–111, 115–117, 126–127.

18. See W.H. Bruford, *The German Tradition of Self-Cultivation: 'Bildung' from Humboldt to Thomas Mann* (Cambridge University Press, 1975), and my review of this book in *Central European History*, Vol. XI, no. 1 (March 1978), pp. 107–113.